




THE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY:

A National Military Work.

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
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
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
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Map
OF THE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAYS
SHOWING
THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE RAILWAYS
AND OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND WITH
THE ALBERT RAILWAY & SHEPODY

*GULF OF
LAWRENCE*



RAILWAYS,
RAILWAYS OF CANADA
OF AMERICA,
HEPODY HARBOUR.



STATE



OF



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
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
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
STEAM ROUTE FROM PORTLAND







SCALE 1 INCH = 25 MILES





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Samuel H. Dawson
Apr 3/68

THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY A NATIONAL MILITARY WORK.

SEVERAL pamphlets have lately been placed before the people and parliament of the dominion of Canada, on the subject of the Intercolonial Railway, but none of them seem to have attracted notice so much as one attributed to the pen of the HON. THE MINISTER OF MARINE AND FISHERIES, entitled, "THE ROUTE OF THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY IN A NATIONAL, COMMERCIAL, AND ECONOMICAL POINT OF VIEW." This pamphlet, styled "The Ottawa Pamphlet," has almost taken the country by storm, and even the Government and Parliament seem to be, in some measure, committed to the route it advocates.

We trust, however—using the words of the pamphlet itself—that with a cool, calm, dispassionate judgment, "*in a spirit elevated far above the petty intrigues of sectional interests, such a route will be selected as, after mature deliberation, will receive the hearty assent of the British Government, and secure the best interests, present and future, of our common country.*"

Hoping to contribute to this most desirable and patriotic end, the writer proposes to review in a national and candid spirit, the pamphlet in question.

The grand object of the Intercolonial Railway, it is admitted, is to secure the cohesion and integrity of the NEW DOMINION; its secondary object, to promote the development of the resources and industry of the country. The route which will best combine these objects is the one which should be chosen.

Looking at the map of British North America, the observant eye is struck with the grandeur, the utility, and the vital importance to the Dominion, of the Gulf and River St.

Lawrence Without these there could be no nationality—no future—for British America, but to become absorbed into the neighbouring Republic. With this vast *nursery* of every element which is required to build up and develop a great maritime power—added to the equally great resources of the territory which it enriches and defends—the Dominion of Canada may safely look forward to a nationality rivalling in greatness, liberty, and wealth, anything which has preceded it.

In considering the dangers which may beset the onward progress of the Dominion, only one from without presents itself—the disposition of our republican neighbours. It cannot be disguised that with the mass of the people of the United States there is a strong aversion to the perpetuity of British institutions on the American Continent—an almost unaccountable and insane hatred of everything British. The "Munroe doctrine" is the first article in their political creed, and they impatiently await an opportunity to gratify at once their national vanity and lust of territory, by extending their flag and institutions over "this vast, unbounded continent." It must be blind, indeed, who does not see how little commercial or social intercourse tends to allay this spirit which is being constantly augmented by Fentanism and jealousy.* There was a time when the people of the United States expected that, in the isolated condition of the provinces, they would fall an easy and willing prey into the arms of the Great Republic; but the last few years—of civil war on their part, and the development of a national spirit in the colonies—has dispelled this delusion, and no hope now remains to our avaricious cousins but to wrest by force what they cannot obtain by stealth.

It is a sentiment with a not very numerous class of our people that the position of the Dominion makes it indefensible; that it is impossible for four millions of people to resist successfully thirty millions along an exposed frontier line of over 1,500 miles; and that our best defences are no defence at all. It is to be regretted that such sentiments as these find a mouth-piece even in the parliament of the Dominion. They are true but to a very limited extent; are ill-advised, and suggest that too often "the wish may be father to the thought."

* Commercial relationships did not prevent the most cruel civil war the world has ever seen. The "Trent Affair," and the abrogation of the "Reciprocity Treaty," show how easily commercial relationships can be snapped asunder.

That there are weak and assailable points in the Dominion may not be denied. What country has not such? But there are also strong places and impregnable defences; and the Dominion is not to be left alone to face thirty millions in a death struggle for the maintenance of its rich and undeniable inheritance.

WHAT ARE THESE STRONG DEFENCES?

In the first place, attachment to British institutions and the Mother country—**BRITISH CONNECTION.**

A few years since the United States stood out in bold relief before the world, challenging its admiration of a great people, self-governed, law-abiding, prosperous, and untaxed, without an army, and but the shadow of a navy, an immense mercantile marine, vast manufactories, and staples which claimed pre-eminence—"Cotton was king." Less than a decade has changed all this, and in its place we find to-day a despotic military power with nearly half its states in chains; a standing army, an enormous debt, crippled commerce; ruined manufactures, taxation, internal anarchy, desolation, discontent, and a mad ambition for territorial aggrandizement—whether at the North Pole or in the Torrid zone. And, worse than all, public and social demoralization and decline, which makes it but a question of time as to when the foreign element shall out-number and out-vote the native population.

Such is the changed aspect of democracy. And against its influence our only hope of the future stability and moral power of the New Dominion lies in our adherence to British laws and institutions which have stood the test of a thousand years, and shine out to-day more brightly and gloriously than ever before. Let the Dominion foster and encourage trade and intercourse with her sister colonies and the mother country; let her open wide her arms, and welcome to new, and peaceful, and free homes the *surplus* populations of the British Isles; let her *protect and jealously preserve her incomparable fisheries*—the grand *nursery* of a great maritime nation—and, adhering to British customs, laws, and usages, the Dominion may afford to await the period when the United States shall be willing to accord "reciprocity" *on equal terms*; and, giving up the propagandism of the "stars and stripes," allow a free people to enjoy their own country and its beneficent institutions, and go on to develop their own destiny without molestation or hindrance. On no other terms than perfect

freedom and equality can commercial relationships with the United States, however desirable, tend to anything else than the absorption of the weaker into the stronger power. Pursuing such a national policy, the Dominion must, in the second place, make the most of its defensive position.

HALIFAX and QUEBEC, the Gulf and River St. Lawrence, and the Great Lakes, the ice of winter and the iron-clads and wooden walls of Old England! These need only to be named to suggest a power of which the maddest annexationists must stand in awe.

But HALIFAX and QUEBEC must be in *safe communication* at all seasons of the year; the safety of the coal-fields of Pictou and Cape Breton, the integrity of the Gulf and Gulf-ports, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, and access to the Great Lakes and the populous cities of Ontario, must be secured; and all this cannot be accomplished without THE INTER-COLONIAL RAILWAY AS A MILITARY WORK

In considering *the route*, it must be admitted that the North Shore line—surveyed and recommended by Major Robinson—is the safest and best, *as a military line*, which can be adopted. The only questions, then, to be considered are: Can this line be departed from? If so, how far? and for what sufficient reasons?

If a chain can only be as strong as its weakest link, it is manifestly worth while to test the links before risking the ship to a fate which a little forethought might have averted.

Is there any weak link in the chain of communication recommended—*almost by semi-official authority*—in the Ottawa pamphlet?

OUR WEAK POINTS.

Along our extensive frontier line there are weak points, if anywhere, which are available to an enterprising enemy, such as the United States might doubtless be; but no *sudden* attack could be made across the Great Lakes or the River St. Lawrence. There would be time to meet keel with keel, and gun with gun, and man with man upon the former; while the latter could be assailed by only such forces as would require time to organize and give warning of their approach. The wilderness would be a protection to Eastern Canada (Quebec) and the northern portion of New Brunswick. But how would it fare with the city and River St. John? What could

prevent an ironclad fleet leaving New York, Boston, and Portland without observation, and appearing off St. John in twenty-four hours—capturing that city, and giving its citizens the first intimation that a state of war existed? What preparations could be made to oppose a simultaneous movement of troops from the frontier upon Woodstock, Frederickton, St. Stephen, St. Andrew's, and St. John?

Long before succour could be dispatched to their aid, the city of St. John and the river St. John, with all the western portion of New Brunswick (including the towns named) would be in the hands of an enemy, unheralded by any of the warning notes which usually precede the thunderbolt of war among civilized nations.

And is there not, in fact, everything to invite aggression at the points we have named?

St. John may be said to be *par excellence* the American city of the Dominion. Much of her business, her steamer-boat communications, her telegraph lines, her railway extension westward, are in the hands of American companies. The latter work openly, and avowedly undertaken *as a United States military line, and approved as such by a Committee of Congress!* It must not be lost sight of that the city of St. John, with the western portion of New Brunswick, including the "River Counties" and Charlotte, from their geographical position and commercial intercourse, have more interests in common with the United States than any other portion of the Dominion; and that in questions of commercial policy and defensive works it is scarcely to be expected that these sections will always be in full accord with the general sentiment of the country.

We do not mean to impugn the *loyalty* of the citizens of St. John and the western towns of New Brunswick—it would be as ungracious as well as an unwarrantable task—but we may say, without fear of contradiction or of giving offence to our loyal fellow-countrymen, that whatever of American sympathy and leaning, whatever of American forecast, and preparation, *and propagandism*, whatever of Fenian disloyalty exists in New Brunswick, it finds its centre and stronghold in St. John. And it may be that, as far as this section of the Dominion is concerned, *no defences are its best defence.*

We submit the question, then, whether the city of St. John, with that section of New Brunswick on the west bank of the St. John river, is not *the weak point* in the defensive position of the Dominion?

We make no reference to other portions of the Dominion

which are not affected by the location of the Intercolonial Railway.

Leaving these preliminary remarks at this point, we propose to come now more directly to the consideration of the *route* recommended by the writer of

THE "OTTAWA PAMPHLET."

Starting from River du Loup, we are pleased with his description of "the rich and fertile country of Tamiscouta and Rimouski;" its "rapidly-increasing agricultural products;" its "import and export traffic," and "fast-growing population;" "the flourishing town of Rimouski, with its bishop's residence, classical college, numerous schools, court-house," &c. And although a portion of the *route* is very circuitous, very much like the figure 3, or a huge ox-yoke, yet the writer has convinced us that the "Central proper" is mountainous and desolate, so dangerous in a snow-storm, so tedious and expensive to build and maintain, and altogether so unprofitable and unpromising, that we are quite ready to believe that in this instance, "*the longest way round is the nearest way home.*"

We are delighted, too, with the *broad, national, statesman-like* views which the pamphlet propounds. "*No paltry intrigue of mere sectional interest*" here! Truly, the Government of the Dominion has fallen into the right hands! But we must not forget the author's interesting and really important *fish stories*. To our mind, they settle the question as to route so far, *in a commercial* as well as *national* point of view. We are serious. Let us by all means, and at whatever cost, develop our incomparable fisheries. *They are the right arm of our defences.*

The last few years have taught our neighbours the value of a navy. But for the navy of the Northern States, the rebellion would probably have triumphed. The want of a sufficient navy was the cause of its failure. In vain were twenty millions of Northerners, with immense advantages on their side, arrayed against less than ten millions of Southerners but for the superiority of the northern navy; and in vain, too, were that navy, but that the *fishermen of the Gulf of St. Lawrence* were at hand to man it—and *there were none to spare.*

The destiny marked out by nature for the Dominion of

Canada is to be a MARITIME NATION. Already the fourth—perhaps the third,—she may ere long become the *first*. We see the mercantile marine of the United States “swept from the ocean,” her ship-yards idle, and her carrying trade in the hands of “foreigners.” With greater facilities for ship-building, whether in wood, or iron, or both; with the development of our fisheries to keep up our sea-faring population; with our great facilities for commerce and manufactures, what is to hinder our taking the first rank as a maritime power? and does not herein lie the germ of that power which requires but a few years’ development to hold in check any enemy? *Let us protect and develope our fisheries.*

NO ENEMY’S BANTLING SHOULD BE ROCKED IN THE CRADLE OF THE NEW DOMINION.

We are decidedly in favour of the *Northern* route.

Arriving at “Indiantown” we have the prospect before us of a *straight and level line, direct to Truro*, over a beautiful and fertile country, well peopled, and having abundant resources of the greatest value and importance to the Dominion, and the future traffic of the railway. Far away from hostile approaches, the cheapest portion of the line to be built and maintained; and something to compensate for the circuitous portion we have been obliged to travel over. What says the Ottawa pamphlet about it? p. 24:—

“Major Robinson’s line encounters but one summit, 750 ft. in height, at the Tantigow river” [north of Indiantown], “and passes it with a continuous grade of only 56 ft. to the mile. *After passing this point, the North Shore line continues on with gentle undulating gradients and an unexceptional alignment for some 250 miles to Bay Verte.*”

We can’t forget that at page 18 our friend told us “that from Bay Chaleurs to *Shediac* are to be found *oyster-beds* of almost boundless extent,” and our next run will bring us to *Shediac*,—only 85 miles. But stop! Our friend, of the Ottawa pamphlet, is off the track—he has left us! Where bound? Down to—*Apohaqui*! To *Apohaqui*? What for? Down to *Apohaqui*—nearly 100 miles away from the *direct line*; over mountain and moor, through deserts and snow-drifts, as much worse than the *central proper*, of which it forms the *worst portion*, as can be imagined. In the name of reason, consistency, truth, honour, patriotism—what for?

Has the author's patriotism; his enlarged and statesmanlike views; his "spirit of elevated nationality" so suddenly evaporated! and has he become the veriest *sectionalist* and *special-pleader* in the country?

"Oh!" says our author, "we are going to *compromise*!" Did not the HON. MINISTER OF MARINE AND FISHERIES, in a speech at Northumberland, offer "*to accept as a compromise of conflicting interests a route which, while it suits us in the North, will give St. John the terminus as near the city as the central route surveyed by Fleming?*" (Ottawa pamphlet, page 30).

And this, then, is the "*spirit elevated far above the petty intrigues of mere sectional interests!*"

Is the man *daft*? or is "the evil genius of St. John" (Pamphlet, page 30) only taking "*a rise*" out of the St. John people?

But, to be more serious. If the Major Robinson line from River du Loup to Indiantown—"the farthest possible distance away from the frontier"—is, as a military line, *good*, why is not *the same line* from Indiantown to Shediac *good* also?

If Fleming's central line from River du Loup is *bad*—on account of its proximity to the American frontier, its deep snows in winter, its want of population, its cost of construction and maintenance, its heavy grades, &c.—why is a central line from Indiantown to Apohaqui, subject to all the same conditions in their most objectionable aspect, not *bad* also?

Why make a *divergence* of nearly 100 miles out of a straight course *to incur* the like difficulties which we have just gone 40 or 50 miles out of a straight course *to avoid*?

To these grave and important questions what is the answer of the Ottawa pamphlet?

Page 31. "No. 13" (the line to Apohaqui) "possesses some merits not shared by Nos. 14 and 15." (The latter is the Major Robinson line.) "*These consist in running nearer the city St. John; in passing through the populous counties of King's, Queen's, and Sunbury without shutting out Kent; in opening up the Coal regions of Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek.*"

These are the reasons, *and the only reasons*, which the pamphlet assigns for this most extraordinary divergence, of nearly 100 miles from a direct course—a divergence WHICH UTTERLY DESTROYS THE WHOLE UNDERTAKING AS A MILITARY WORK, SETS AT DEFIANCE ALL THE RULES AND REASONS ASSIGNED FOR TAKING THE FIRST PORTION OF

IT ROUND THE NORTH SHORE, AND FOR REFUSING THE SHORTER CENTRAL ROUTE OF FLEMING, AND IGNORING THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS PROFOUNDED BY ITSELF !

THE APOHAQUI DIVERGENCE,

IN A MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND COMMERCIAL
POINT OF VIEW.

Without professing to be a strategist, we have endeavoured to take a common sense view of the military aspect of the question; and if we are correct in the position that the city and river St. John are the *weak points* of the Dominion, then the location of the Intercolonial Railway by Apohaqui would be the worst possible. An enemy's gunboats in summer, and artillery on sleds in winter, could ascend the Washdamoak and Grand Lakes with the greatest facility, and completely command the greatest portion of the line through New Brunswick, entirely destroying its value as a military work, if not turning it to account against us. We trust, however, this point will not be lost sight of by the British Government.

Looking at the question in its "commercial" and "economic" aspects, any one acquainted with the country will be struck with astonishment at the audacity of the writer in offering reasons so palpably weak and absurd for so serious a deviation as we have shown this to be. To such it will appear a waste of time and paper to discuss them, but coming as they do, *endorsed by a sort of semi-official authority*, they will pass current with readers who do not know the country. We propose, therefore, to give them a full, careful, grave, and candid consideration, and we ask, in view of the momentous interests at stake, that our objections to them may receive the like candid consideration from the people of the Dominion.

At page 11 of the pamphlet the reasons are assigned in the following words :—

"The Northern Central line [the line advocated—it would be more aptly called the Oxbow-zigzag line] combines all the advantages of Major Robinson's line, with several others not secured by the latter.

"It is about the same length to build.

"Gives Kings, Queens, and Sunbury the advantage of the Railway without depriving Kent of the privilege.

"And opens up the Coal Regions of Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek.

" This being the case we shall consider it as essentially Major Robinson's line though preferable to it in all respects. This will leave the question confined to two lines, the Northern Central and the Central proper. AS ONE OF THESE IS SURE TO BE ADOPTED, the merits of each shall have a fair and impartial consideration."

We have quoted the whole paragraph to introduce the sentence we have marked in small caps. As this implies that the Government are sure to adopt APOHAQUI as the terminus whether by "the Central proper" or "the Northern Central,"

We now take up the reasons *seriatim*.

" IT IS ABOUT THE SAME LENGTH TO BUILD."

By looking at the map, the reader will understand that from Indiantown to Shediac the Major Robinson line pursues almost a straight course (south-easterly) to Truro, the distance to Shediac being about 85 miles. By the divergence from Indiantown to Apohaqui the line runs south about 95 miles, leaving only about 10 miles difference *to build*; but back to Shediac, over the European and North American line (already built), is 80 miles, making a difference of 90 miles *extra to travel* between Halifax and Quebec. Understanding this the reader of the different pamphlets and newspaper articles on this subject will not be *caught* by the specious arguments about distance based on the number of miles "*to be built*."

2nd. THE POPULATIONS OF KINGS, QUEENS, AND SUNBURY GET THE ADVANTAGE OF THE RAILWAY, WITHOUT DEPRIVING KENT OF THE PRIVILEGE.

At page 42. We are informed that the populations of these counties were at the last census as follows:—

" Kings	23,283
Queens	13,359
Sunbury	6,057
Kent	15,854."

Turning to the Map of New Brunswick on Fleming's map, accompanying his report, the reader will see that the counties of Kings, Queens, and Sunbury, are cut across by the river St. John, and intersected by its tributaries—the Grand and Washdemoak lakes, Belleisle Bay, and the River Kennebecacis—entirely separating large portions of their populations from any connection with the Intercolonial Railway *via* Apohaqui—which, however, is matter of no consequence to them, as the European and North American Railway Extension westward runs through the cut-off portions.

THE COUNTY OF KINGS, on the eastern side of the St. John, is intersected its whole length through the very centre of its population by the European and North American Railway; but even the facilities thus afforded them *are very little used*, as the water communications and excellent roads by which the inhabitants of Kings get to market *are cheaper than the railway*. The running of the Intercolonial Railway through the corner of one of the remote parishes of Kings (Studholm with a population of 2,846) already having the European and North American Railway through its settled centre, *is all that can be claimed for Kings—and is just nothing!*

THE COUNTY OF QUEENS, east of the St. John's, has the Washdemoak and Grand lakes—the latter a fine sheet of water—intersecting its entire length, and cutting it into three parts. Its population lives along the river St. John and on the banks of these lakes, and its communications are mostly by water—having the St. John river-steamers in summer and the ice of winter as the most ready means for their locomotion. The parishes crossed by the railway would be Chipman, Waterborough, and Brunswick, with a population of less than 3,500, mostly far away from the railway which runs through the remote wilderness portion of these parishes, as we will see further on.

THE COUNTIES OF SUNBURY AND KENT are divided by a point like the intersection of the letter X in the centre.

The parish of Northfield, in Sunbury, has 396 inhabitants; the parish of Harcourt, in Kent, has 100 inhabitants—none of them within miles of the intersection where the railway must pass, which is wilderness.

Professor Hind, Provincial Geologist, in his report to Hon. S. L. TILLEY, Provincial Secretary, in 1865, speaking of this district, says (page 69):—

“A very considerable portion of this extensive area must still be regarded as a *terra incognita*. It is chiefly occupied by the ‘forest primeval,’ and large districts have not yet been topographically examined, except for timber berths. In the Government map, published in 1859 (Mr. Wilkinson), which embodies so large an amount of geographical information there are still left vacant spots which show a paucity of existing knowledge even as to the rivers which drain them. A glance at the map will enable any one to point to such areas *between the upper waters of Salmon River, and Washdemoak River in the parish of Brunswick, the north part of Salisbury, and the north east part of Waterborough.*”

The Professor might have added “Chipman,” but it was not worth naming. This is the identical route to Apohaqui, as will be seen by reference to Fleming's map, which is a copy of Wilkinson's, referred to by the Professor.

But "KENT WILL NOT BE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE."

The Major Robinson line runs *through the very centre of KENT*, touching every parish of it, and giving railway facilities to every soul of their 16,000 inhabitants, who will otherwise be for ever debarred of the privilege. How, then, can it be that taking it away to the north-east corner of Sunbury will not deprive Kent of the privilege?

So much for the second proposition!—comment is unnecessary.

Now for the *third* proposition:—

"THE COAL REGIONS (!) OF GRAND LAKE, SALMON RIVER, AND COAL CREEK, ARE TO BE OPENED UP."

The author of the pamphlet tells us how many *pounds of fresh fish* are taken at Bathurst, Miramichi, and Restigouche. Would it not have been equally interesting and instructive to have informed his readers *how many tons of coal* are raised at the coal REGIONS of Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek? But he has not done so! and we must turn to the latest authorities we have on the subject, as to the extent, productiveness, and probable value of these coal regions.

Professor L. W. Bailey, of the University of New Brunswick, in a report on the mines and minerals of New Brunswick, presented to the Legislature by His Excellency Governor Gordon, in 1864, at pages 62—63 says:—

"For facts relating to the whole subject of the distribution of coal in the provinces, see Dr. Robb's letter in Johnson's Agricultural Report, pages 38 '0."

"Since writing the above (the Professor goes on to say), I have been furnished through the kindness of Mr. C. W. Wetmore with the following particulars in regard to the coal deposits of the Grand Lake Region. During the year 1863, as far as can be ascertained the coal raised was 3,000 chaldrons. The coal is found in a bed of from 14 to 20 inches thickness outcropping at many points over an area of several miles. The bed is found at depths varying from 6 to 30 feet below the surface. The mining operations have been for some years confined chiefly to the Newcastle Stream, but a little coal has also been removed near the mouth of the Little River, and of late on the Salmon River. The bed at the latter locality is said to be of the same thickness as that at Newcastle."

After describing the mode of mining, shipping, and so on, the Professor goes on to say:—

"The locality is, however, not altogether a promising one, and unless a thicker bed should be discovered, which is not probable, mining operations cannot be carried on very successfully. The coal is of the 'caking' variety, igniting readily, but requiring frequent stirring for complete combustion. One of the principal objections to its use is the presence of *pyrites*, which in some portions is very abundant."

Professor Hind, in his Report, before quoted, takes a some-

what more favourable view of the subject, and at pages 76—78 says:—

"The coal raised at Grand Lake from a twenty-two inch seam has hitherto been brought to market in a hap-hazard sort of way. Any farmer who finds a seam on his land employs persons to dig out a certain quantity of coal; this is bought up by agents and shipped to Frederickton, St. John, and elsewhere. It sold at Frederickton at \$6½ a chaldron at the commencement of the winter 1864-5, and it appears that about 5,000 chaldrons were shipped from Grand Lake during the season. The quality of coal is good now that more care is taken to separate the lumps of iron pyrites with which some portions of the seam abound. An American Company has leased a tract of land on Grand Lake, and there is every probability that the supply will be largely increased. The blacksmiths of St. John consider it very well adapted for their purposes, and prefer it to imported coals. It has very little ash, and in a properly constructed grate makes an excellent fire.

"Quantity of coal raised at Grand Lake:—

" 1828	.	.	.	.	.	66 chaldrons
1830	.	.	.	.	.	70 "
1833	.	.	.	.	.	138 "
1834	.	.	.	.	.	687 "
1835	.	.	.	.	.	3537 "
1839	.	.	.	.	.	2143 "
1864	.	.	.	.	.	5000 " "

In a foot-note the Professor says:—"I am indebted to Mr. Wetmore, of Frederickton, for these facts."

And these are *all the "facts"* the Professor in a very elaborate scientific article on the subject has to reveal. He indulges in some *speculations* which we will refer to further on.

We have no desire to belittle the coal deposits "at Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek." We trust that when the country becomes opened up other and larger deposits may be found, but if the production was a thousand times what it actually now is, the Intercolonial Railway could be of very little, if any, service in developing these regions; nor would they afford much, if any, revenue to the railway in return for such service. It will be observed that the *coal raised* is from "Grand Lake," according to Professor Hind—from the "Newcastle Stream," according to Professor Bailey—the *same place*, several miles down the Lake, and not approached by the route to Apohaqui. "But," says Professor Bailey, "*a little coal has been raised at the mouth of the Little River and of late on the Salmon River.*" "Little River" is further down the Lake, and "Salmon River," with Coal Creek—not alluded to in the reports—are the only districts to be "opened up" by the Apohaqui route. *But all these districts have already the Grand Lake for an outlet*, where, at small expense, vessels of large tonnage can come directly to the mines and load. It needs

no argument to prove that this mode of conveyance is the preferable one, and that, however large the business might become, it would be the successful competitor with the railway.

We submit the question whether it is worth while to make a deviation of 100 miles in the route of the Intercolonial Railway—at vast expense—in order “to open up the coal regions of Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek.”

The *fourth* and last advantage claimed for this most extraordinary divergence

“CONSISTS IN RUNNING NEARER THE CITY OF
ST. JOHN.”

What advantage this would be to—

The railway itself;
The city of St. John;
The Province of New Brunswick;
The people of the Dominion;
Or the world in general,

is not stated.

THE CITY OF ST. JOHN, as will be seen by reference to the map, will be in railway communication with MONTREAL—the commercial emporium—*via* Western Extension, from 170 to 200 miles nearer than by the Intercolonial, *via* Apohaqui

And by the former route nearer even to QUEBEC.

For purposes of travel or traffic, then, the Intercolonial will be little required and *little supported* by the City of St. John.

We can conceive of no possible advantage the City of St. John can derive from this divergence of the Intercolonial Railway, unless it is the expectation of drawing the trade of the north shore. But this would be a manifest injustice to the northern and eastern counties of New Brunswick, as well as to HALIFAX; and the expectations formed in this direction, by the opening of the European and North American Railway, having been so signally disappointed, we would suppose no sane man would indulge so problematical a suggestion.

It might be supposed, at first blush, that the northern counties might derive some advantages from a nearer connection with St. John as a market and outlet for their staple—*fish*. But it must be remembered that, at most, this would be very limited. The GREAT WEST, EUROPE, the WEST INDIES, and SOUTH AMERICA are the principle markets for this staple. The trade

with the west will be, of course, by the St. Lawrence and the Intercolonial to Quebec and westward; the trade with Europe is direct; the trade with the West Indies and South America *via* Halifax. The latter city has been, is now, and is likely always to be, the emporium of the fish and West India trade. St. John, with apparently great facilities, has never succeeded in diverting any appreciable portion of this trade—not even by the opening of the European and North American Railway, as we have stated; and large quantities of West Indian produce are constantly being moved from Halifax to St. John.

The deviation of the Intercolonial Railway would, then, be a manifest injustice to the northern counties, *by forcing them* from their natural market and outlet, Halifax, at the peril of having to undergo 80 miles or more additional transportation. The railway by the Major Robinson line will give the north shore merchant, on arrival at Shediac, a choice of markets—Halifax or St. John—the latter having, even then, an advantage of about 70 or 80 miles in railway distance. No injustice would be done to St. John by this route; while by the other, very great injustice would be done both to the northern counties and to Halifax. Whatever market the United States might afford for fish is altogether uncertain and contingent, and scarcely worth mention. But the European and North American Railway gives all the advantage of it to the city of St. John, and all that can reasonably be required.

We now submit to the consideration of our readers all the grave reasons—"merits," "advantages"—which can be advanced in favour of a divergence of the Intercolonial Railway nearly 100 miles out of a direct course between Quebec and Halifax. We think we might stop here and "go to the jury" with our case. But the question is a momentous one, and the *Judge*, by his own showing, has prejudged and "*compromised*," it. *The interests of THE DOMINION to be compromised! and that, too, to subserve the most ill-defined and problematic SECTIONAL interests* that can well be conceived! What authority any individual had to *compromise* this grave matter we must leave the Parliament and people of the Dominion to determine, while we proceed to show that there are the strongest "national, commercial, and economic" reasons, as well as *sectional*, why this deviation should not be permitted.

SECTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE APOHAQUI ROUTE.

If *sectional* interests have any weight—and they may have as far as they subserve the national character of the railway—then there are other portions of New Brunswick having greater interest and claims than the city of St. John.

The counties of WESTMORELAND, ALBERT and KENT—the north-eastern counties of New Brunswick—have a population nearly double that of the city of St. John, 50,545 v. 27,317; they have resources far exceeding in value and importance to the Dominion, *and the traffic receipts of the railway* anything which can be reasonably expected, from the city of St. John and the Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek, coal regions added.

And Albert has “*the best and nearest port on the Bay of Fundy*” to the River St. Lawrence. (See Appendix).

We need not dwell on the question of population—the census is our authority for the figures already given, and also the fact that the *greatest increase* of population is in the counties last named.

With reference to the resources of these counties—Kent not only possesses equality with her northern sister-counties all the fishing, lumbering, milling, shipbuilding, and other resources which enrich them, but contains the most valuable portion of the coal REGIONS of “Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek,” if these coal regions exist.

Referring, again, to PROFESSOR HIND, he says:—

“Dr. Robb examined the Coal on the Richibucto in 1849. He here found a seam 15 inches thick on *Coal Brook*. The Coal Cakes like the Grand Lake Coal and the dip is N. W. 10°. Judging by the quality and thickness of the seam it may yet prove to be the same as the one at the head of the Grand Lake.”

Again:—

“If the Grand Lake seam extends *toward the Coal Branch on the Richibucto*, and appears there with a thickness of 15 inches, as suggested by Dr. Robb, the total mass of coal on a length of 40 miles and a breadth of 15 miles would amount to the enormous quantity of six hundred millions of chaldrons.”

From this it is seen that whatever of value may be developed by the coal REGIONS of Grand Lake, &c., *depends upon their extending to the Coal Branch of the Richibucto* (in Kent).

If our readers will now turn to Fleming's map, they will see that Major Robinson's line crosses the words "COAL BRANCH" on the Richibucto, at the exact spot where Dr. Robb found the 15-inch seam! And *here* the railway might be of some service in developing the coal REGIONS, as there is no water or other conveyance to compete with it. We do not say that Dr. Robb's, or Professor Hind's discoveries, or scientific *speculations* are a sufficient warrant for locating THE INTER-COLONIAL RAILWAY anywhere; but whatever of value there may be in them, points directly to the Major Robinson line as the proper location. We may add that similar seams of coal have since been found, and are known to the writer of the pamphlet, and others, all along the Major Robinson line, from Coal Branch to Bay Verie.

But what shall be said of the WESTMORELAND AND ALBERT COAL REGIONS?

In the first place, the "Albert Mines," famous all the world over for the richest *oil* and *gas* materials known, raises nearly 20,000 tons, per annum. This is principally shipped to the States; a large portion of it is manufactured into oil at Portland, Maine, on which heavy duties, excise, and import are paid to the United States; thence the oil is sent to Montreal and Quebec, paying duties to the Dominion! The building and location of the Intercolonial Railway by the Major Robinson line, will, it is hoped, induce the manufacture of this article on the spot, and its transportation by rail to the Upper Provinces. There is every reason why it should.

But even this is a *small matter* compared with the cannel beds of Dorchester and Memramcook in Westmoreland, and Baltimore and Turtle Creek in Albert. These beds, principally hundreds of feet above water-levels, and of very great thickness, are capable of producing practically *unlimited* quantities of a very rich material for the production of *gas* of extraordinary brilliancy, and *oil* of superior quality; from which, ere long, doubtless, the cities of the Dominion will be supplied with these essential articles, and the Intercolonial Railway derive its most direct and profitable traffic.

Passing by, however, for the present, other sectional and local interests that coincide with the great national considerations which require adherence to the *route* that shall best effect the object of connecting Halifax and Quebec by the shortest and safest practicable line, we would now invite the attention of the Honourable Minister of Marine and Fisheries to some features of the question, which it seems wonderful

a man of his sagacity and foresight should have so long overlooked.

One great purpose of the Intercolonial Railway ever prominently held up to public view has been "the facility it would afford to Canada and the great interior of the Dominion of ready access to *the Atlantic seaboard* at all times and seasons."

A reference to a map of the *border country* of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia will show that the line of railway is here in a great measure determined by the *physical geography* of the district. Coming out of Canada, on the *shortest line* tending towards the Atlantic, the first points of navigation we reach are *the head waters of the Bay of Fundy* at and near the Bend of the Petitcodiac. Steamers and vessels of large tonnage ascend with the tide of this river to Moncton, which is therefore *the nearest station* at which the traffic of the Intercolonial Railway can be exchanged to and from vessels and crafts navigating the Bay of Fundy. But, it may be objected, this place is high up a tidal river, and is, moreover, for several months closed in winter. There is, however, at a distance of only 30 or 35 miles lower down a safe and spacious harbour possessing so many advantages and capabilities as to deserve the official consideration of the intelligent Minister of Marine and Fisheries, not only in connection with the location of the Intercolonial Railway, but with reference to the *general interests* of the Confederate Provinces.

The Harbour of SHEPODY, at the mouth of the Petitcodiac and Shepody rivers, is formed and sheltered by a remarkable promontory called St. Mary's Point, and Grindstone Island, on the latter of which is a government lighthouse, built within a few years. The concurrent testimony of the oldest pilots and coasters proclaims this harbour as *the best and safest* in the Bay of Fundy; and it is, moreover, the only *low water harbour* and *port of refuge* above St. John. The admiralty chart shows a depth of five fathoms at the dead lowest tides; the anchorage is excellent over a very extensive area, and the harbour is very rarely, if ever, obstructed by ice. Instances have occurred where coasters from the bay have been nipped by frost in Boston and other harbours of the United States, and after having been cut out, have returned without interruption into Shepody; and it is a fact that freestone has been shipped from Mary's Point *in every month* of the year. We, therefore, unhesitatingly direct the attention of the Minister of Marine and the Government to Shepody as the *nearest*

available outlet to the Atlantic, and the desired ENTREPOT for the *heavy traffic* between the Bay of Fundy and the upper provinces. If these facts are doubted or disputed, let an investigation be made by duly appointed Commissioners, or by a Committee of the House of Commons, for this is a matter of too much importance to be overlooked at this period of the Dominion's history.

We can well understand why public men heretofore connected with the local government of New Brunswick should wish to incorporate a portion of the European and North American Railway with the Intercolonial line; and the public have long been familiar with a proposition to form the junction of the two at or near Salisbury or Moncton. It is said that there are no difficulties of *route* in this direction, and the deviation from the Major Robinson line would be comparatively very trifling, and add little, if anything, to the distance. A branch line to run from the European and North American, through the County of Albert, to Shepody Harbour has already been provided for, and a company organized and ready to commence operations as soon as the *route* of the Intercolonial shall be determined. Assuming this to be carried out, and the facts to be as above stated, *the whole of the Canadian railways would be in communication with a first-class port on the Bay of Fundy*, which may be regarded as the *natural outlet and entrepôt* for their heavy traffic, inasmuch as it would be nearer by 140 miles than Halifax, and by 40 or 50 than St. John, and nothing inferior to either as a point of departure or importation to or from any part of the world.

We now propose to refer briefly to some facts bearing on the main question, which seem hitherto to have been unaccountably ignored. It will not be disputed that those parts of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick surrounding the Bay of Fundy, and watered by its tributaries, are by far *the richest portions* of the Dominion *in every point of view*. The extraordinary tides that flow into every river, creek, and inlet come fraught with the most fertilizing manures, and afford, at the same time, ready means of transportation for the agricultural products which abound on every hand. The coal fields of the Joggins and Cumberland basin immediately opposite Shepody Harbour; the gypsum, freestone, and grindstone formations on the shores of the Nova Scotia, as well as the New Brunswick, arms of the bay; the iron, copper, manganese, barytes, marble, and other minerals which abound in various places; the wood, and timber, and fisheries along such extended coast and river lines; and last, not least,

the industrious and variously occupied populations inhabiting those shores accuse an arrangement that should leave them "out in the cold" and ignore their interests and importance. It is not as a *boon* that they demand that the railway communication shall touch them at some convenient point, and afford them and their various products means of access to the interior markets. They are prepared to give a *quid pro quo*, and we here express our confident belief that the eastern counties of New Brunswick and the territories surrounding the Bay of Fundy and its tributaries will, through the Port of Shepody, in future years furnish the lion's share of the *back traffic* of the Intercolonial, as well as prove, in proportion to their population, the best customers and largest consumers of western products. Shepody, from its great natural advantages, and its commanding geographical position, seems so fully to answer the prospective requirements of Intercolonial communications and trade as to deserve the unbiassed attention of those to whom it belongs to deal with the important questions which agitate the Dominion at the present moment.

It may be suggested that St. John is the great port of the Bay of Fundy, and so for the present it is; but the resources and products to which we refer, as well as the most populous and enterprising communities are, for the most part, found on the upper waters of the Bay, a hundred miles and more above St. John, and consequently by so much nearer to Canada proper. The downward traffic of the Intercolonial Railway will be for the most part composed of timber, deals, lumber, staves, ashes, flour, and other bulky articles, which will naturally seek the nearest port of shipment. The return cargoes, in exchange for the above, will also as naturally come to the same entrepôt; and if it can be shown that the proposed deviation will, in addition to other disadvantages, have the effect of depriving the great interior of the confederation of the advantages and natural facilities of the shortest line and the nearest ocean outlet, it is to be hoped that the Imperial Government will pause and inquire before sanctioning the Apohaqui compromise.

Reverting again to the SECTIONAL aspect of this subject, we note that

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND,
NEWFOUNDLAND,

and a large portion of NOVA SCOTIA, including the CITY OF HALIFAX, and the coal regions of Nova Scotia and Cape

Breton—are entirely ignored by the writer of the Ottawa pamphlet.

Why should all these *sections* of the Dominion and neighbouring provinces be obliged, in going to the Upper Provinces to travel down the European and North American Railway 70 miles to Apohaqui and thence *back*, through a wretched wilderness, nearly 100 miles to Indiantown?

And, further,—

Why should the people of Miramichi and the northern counties of New Brunswick, of Eastern Canada, and Quebec—travelling to Halifax or Europe—be compelled to travel 100 miles out of their course to Apohaqui?

And yet further,—

Why should the people of Ontario and the Far West be compelled, on account of a longer distance by the Intercolonial line, to take the American line in travelling between the Upper and Lower Provinces?

Is it intended to establish a system of passports, and compel all travellers in the Dominion to go to the city of St. John to be *visé*?

We think that it has been shown conclusively that, in a *sectional* point of view, there is no just and tangible claim whatever on the part of the “city of St. John,” the “Grand Lake, Salmon River, and Coal Creek Coal regions,” or the “populations of Kings, Queens, or Sunbury,” to warrant so serious a divergence of the Intercolonial Railway as the writer of the Ottawa Pamphlet proposes.

But, *on the contrary*, the strongest and most weighty *sectional* reasons why there should be no divergence, at all events, none that will add unnecessarily to the length or impair the efficiency of the railway.

Having followed the author of the pamphlet from Indiantown to Apohaqui on his *sectional divergence from the straight course*, and settled the account with him, it now devolves on us to *finish his work*, and show that “National, Commercial, and Economic” reasons *require the continuance of the Major Robinson line, pure and simple, or with the trifling deviation above referred to.*

THE “ECONOMIC” VIEW.

The cost of building 100 miles from Indiantown to Apohaqui, over heavy grades, through as wretched a piece of wilderness as can be found in New Brunswick,

(most of the distance) without inhabitants or resources—subject to all the worst features of Fleming's central route will be, at his *average* figures of \$46,000 per mile, *if not much more*; and *not* at Major Robinson's estimate for the North Shore line of \$35,000, as the author of the Ottawa Pamphlet, in his hallucination, states it,—

While the Major Robinson line from Indiantown to Shediac—being the best and easiest portion of the North Shore line, would not probably cost \$20,000 a mile, and be at least ten miles shorter, making a difference of not less than TWO MILLIONS EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS, *to be paid by the Dominion* for the Apohaqui whistle!

But this is not all—the maintenance will be equally expensive; and, in the end, THE SECTION FROM INDIANTOWN TO SHEDIAC OR MONCTON WILL HAVE TO BE BUILT. The people of the Dominion will not continue to travel—nor compel the world to travel—90 or 100 miles *out of their way* unnecessarily.

Thus the whole cost of the section from Indiantown to Apohaqui, NOT LESS THAN FIVE MILLIONS OF DOLLAR will become a dead loss. So much for the "Economic" view of the subject. Now

THE "COMMERCIAL" VIEW.

Commercial relations *between the Upper Provinces and the city of St. John* are confined principally to interchange of commodities *between St. John and Montreal*—the great emporium of the West. With the city of Quebec, and, indeed, that portion of the province of Quebec below MONTREAL, ST. JOHN has no commerce; and in the nature of things it is not probable, if possible, that she ever will have—at all events, to any great extent. The resources and industries of both are very much the same: shipping, ship-building, lumbering, mills, fishing, mining and climatic productions, and manufactures. *There is nothing to exchange.* The reverse holds good with reference to MONTREAL and the Western Province—a purely agricultural region.

The Intercolonial Railway, by any of the routes proposed, as a *commercial line* "pure and simple," carrying a through freight traffic between the Upper and Lower Provinces, and capable of competing with existing modes of conveyance, no one except a writer in one of the ST. JOHN'S morning papers attempts to show.

The error of the writer of the "Ottawa pamphlet" and of the writers of other pamphlets and newspaper articles, emanating from the city of ST. JOHN, seems to be in trying to combine two conflicting elements or interests, viz.:—

*A Military Railway between QUEBEC and HALIFAX, with
a Commercial Railway between MONTREAL and ST. JOHN.*

IT CANNOT BE DONE. As well try to mix oil and water.

A glance at the map ought to satisfy any intelligent observer on this point. The writers to whom we have referred are careful enough to keep MONTREAL *out of sight* in the discussion of this subject, and speak only of *River du Loup*. With them the latter seems to stand for the former—distance and difficulties between them are ignored. But, as Nature has placed nearly 300 miles of the River St. Lawrence in the intermediate space, and ordained that it shall freeze up and be ice-bound *as fast and as long* as the river and gulf below, we cannot understand the commercial advantage of a ship discharging cargo at *River du Loup* to be transferred over 350 to 400 miles of railway to ST. JOHN, when the same vessel has open water to proceed to *Shediac*—as is now done by the Gulf steamers—unless, indeed, the merchants of MONTREAL remove their stores to *River du Loup* in winter to accommodate their St. John customers.

What important *way traffic*, or general interest, a line from *River du Loup* to the city of ST. JOHN—even *by the shortest possible central route*—would develop, is *not shown*; and is difficult to conjecture. It would not be trade with MONTREAL, and there is nothing to trade in at *River du Loup*, or between ST. JOHN and QUEBEC, as has been shown; it could not be the fisheries, nor lumbering; the lumberer's axe and fire have not left anything within available railway distance to be transported; there are no mines or minerals on the way, as yet discovered; the coal regions of Grand Lake—we will say nothing more of them; there is no population on the route; and, until the European and North American Railway *develops* the agricultural population through "the garden of New Brunswick," and makes the lands along the line worth "Five pounds an acre," as the Government of New Brunswick promised the Messrs. Barings it would do—neither of which has yet begun to be realized—it is scarcely prudent to make large calculations in this direction.

But if there is now, or is ever likely to be developed, *a way*

traffic which can support the Intercolonial Railway, it must be looked for and hoped for in the development of the fisheries of the Gulf, and of the iron, coals, oils, and other minerals and manufactures of the northern and north-eastern counties of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and the eastern counties of Quebec, *and in future commercial relations with* PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND and NEWFOUNDLAND. This, we think, any *commercial* man who takes an impartial view of the subject will see at a glance. And it is a matter of importance that *these* commercial relations are of such a nature as to make them peculiarly *national* in their development and influence. *They go hand in hand with the military aspect of the question*; and each tends, in no small degree, to develope and strengthen the other.

It should not be forgotten, in this connection, that the interests which prevail to-day may not be paramount a few years hence. The influences which give rapid growth to a new country—fertile lands, abundant timber, water communications, and nearness of neighbouring communities—have had their day and development in New Brunswick, and are now, in some respects, on the wane; whilst those of later development—mining, manufactures, maritime pursuits, and the great fisheries—are but springing into life. Is it unreasonable, then, to expect such a development along the “north shore” of New Brunswick—of Quebec and Nova Scotia—and cities, towns, and busy marts of industry rising up in all its numerous bays and harbours, carrying on trade and commerce with the world?

The true “*commercial* line, pure and simple,” to connect the city of ST. JOHN with MONTREAL and the GREAT WEST has not yet been mooted. When *the Intercolonial Railway*, AS A MILITARY LINE, shall have established peaceable relations *and reciprocity* between us and our neighbours *on a permanent basis*; when the European and North American Railway is completed, and has opened up the country through which it passes; when the north shore interests and resources have been fairly dealt with and developed, and the country becomes enriched, and better communications are required, the city of ST. JOHN may find *a direct through line* which will give her all the control of the Atlantic business of the Great West which it is possible for her to have. *Her efforts now, if successful in diverting the Intercolonial Railway from its true location, would only result “in chasing a shadow and losing the substance.”*

One point more in this connection remains to be noticed:—

The distance from HALIFAX to MONTREAL, by the Major Robinson line, will be about the same as by the EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN RAILWAY *viâ* ST. JOHN and the UNITED STATES. If there is any difference, it will be in favour of the latter—perhaps ten miles or so.

With an *equal* distance we might not fear competition. The northern (or Major Robinson) line is through a beautiful and well-settled country nearly all its distance—remarkably salubrious, cool and pleasant in summer, and *far less liable to drifts and detensions in winter*—the American route is very much the reverse of all this. But after arriving at Shediac or Moncton, send passengers 60 or 70 miles down to Apohaqui, and then ask them *to go back* 100 miles through the wilderness to Indiantown, and it will be strange indeed if they do not take the United States route, even though they should have to be *visé and pay toll* at the city of ST. JOHN.

THE APOHAQUI ROUTE, BY DIVERGING FROM A STRAIGHT COURSE, WILL INCREASE THE DISTANCE BY THE INTER-COLONIAL RAILWAY TO NEARLY ONE HUNDRED MILES MORE THAN BY THE EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN RAILWAY! THEREBY THROWING ALL THE ADVANTAGE OF DISTANCE IN FAVOUR OF AN AMERICAN RIVAL LINE, TO THE UTTER RUIN OF THE "INTERCOLONIAL" IN A "COMMERCIAL" POINT OF VIEW.

THE "NATIONAL" POINT OF VIEW.

No attempt has been made to show that any *national* interest will be subserved by the Apohaqui divergence. And were it not for the great importance of the subject, we might pass over this point without further note or comment; but when it is remembered that the main objects of the INTER-COLONIAL RAILWAY are the defence, cohesion, and development of the DOMINION; that the Dominion, looking forward to a no distant future when it shall stretch its bounds from Newfoundland to Vancouver, and, extending its GREAT RAILWAY to the Pacific, asks the nations from east to west to pass and repass through a country unsurpassed in beauty, fertility, wealth, and magnificence, *the greatness* of the subject demands that *all sectional* views shall be laid aside, and that, in an enlarged, comprehensive, patriotic, and loyal spirit, our *grand railway artery* shall be so located as to

serve the general interests, AS A NATIONAL WORK, for all time to come. That into it new cities and centres of commerce and industry, as they from time to time arise and make progress, shall bring their branches to swell the volume of its mighty commerce and its world-wide influence.

The *great interests of the Dominion*—defence, cohesion, colonial intercourse, the fisheries, the development of the varied treasures of the Gulf coasts, immigration—all requiring the shortest and most safe route *through our own territory*, demand the northern route, while the EMPIRE and the WORLD have an equal claim that we shall not force them for all time to come to travel over an unnecessary hundred miles of inhospitable wilderness, or elect the United States lines from HALIFAX to VICTORIA.

CONCLUSION.

From the period that Lord Durham, then Governor-General of British North America, was first instructed to turn his attention to "the formation of a road between Halifax and Quebec," the Imperial Government have ever kept in view the connection of those two important strategic positions by the safest and shortest practicable *route*. Ever since the survey for a railroad was undertaken in 1846, it has in all reports, state papers, and official communications, been designated "The Halifax and Quebec Railway." Every offer of aid on the part of the Imperial Government has been in that name. In a memorable dispatch from the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Hon. Joseph Hawke, of the 10th March, 1851, the guarantee of the Imperial Government is made contingent upon arrangements to be made with the provinces of New Brunswick and Canada, for the construction of a line of railway, passing wholly through British territory from Halifax to Quebec, and it is expressly stipulated that "any deviation from the line recommended by Major Robinson and Captain Henderson must be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government."

In the following year, when application was made to the British Government for aid to construct a railway on a different route, Sir John Pakington, then principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a dispatch to Lord Elgin,

dated the 20th May, 1852, referring to former correspondence, says: "It will appear evident that no pledge has been given of assistance to any line, except that originally proposed;" and he adds, "Among the peculiar advantages which it was thought that the line recommended on the report of Major Robinson and Captain Henderson would realize, were the opening up of a new tract of maritime country, easily accessible with the railroad, but almost unapproachable without it, to emigration from these islands; and the effecting : safe and continuous route through the provinces, which, both by its distance from the American frontier and its proximity to the sea, might be peculiarly available for military purposes." This is the language of the distinguished statesman who is now charged with the military defences of the empire, and whose opinion on this important question is entitled to the highest consideration.

The noble premier, ever the zealous and able advocate of the British North American Provinces, which he visited in early life, during a debate in the House of Lords on the 14th February 1851, in which he strongly supported the proposition of Imperial assistance to this great national undertaking, said: "He held that the establishment of a line of communication between *Halifax* and *Quebec* for a distance of about 700 miles, through an exclusively British territory, rendering two points—and *two points essential to the power of this country*—which are now separated by a vast extent of wilderness on the one side, and by a difficult and, for a great portion of the year, frozen coast on the other, rendering their communications from being what they now are, most uncertain, most difficult, and most dilatory—rendering it rapid, easy and constant—that was an object in itself of primary importance to the interests and to the imperial power of this country on the Continent of America."

The 145th section of the Act of the Imperial Parliament confederating the provinces, makes imperative "the commencement within six months after the union of a railway connecting the river St. Lawrence with the city of Halifax in Nova Scotia." Then follows "an Act authorizing a guarantee of interest on a loan to be raised by *Canada* towards the construction of a railway connecting *Quebec* and Halifax." The Act recites that "the construction of a railway connecting the port of *Rivière du Loup*, in the Province of Quebec, with the line of railway leading from the city of Halifax in the province of Nova Scotia, at or near the town of Truro, in a line and on conditions approved by one of Her Majesty's

Principal Secretaries of State, would conduce to the welfare of *Canada*, and promote the interests of the *British Empire*;" and provides that "the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury shall not give any guarantee under this Act, unless and until the line in which the railway is to be constructed has been approved by one of HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE."

APPENDIX.

SHEPODY HARBOUR,

Inside of Grindstone Island, is capacious and safe, having from its southern extremity at Mary's Point to the mouth of Shepody River, a harbour line of two miles in length, by upwards of half a mile wide, with from two and a half to full five fathoms water at *lowest spring tides*. Inside the Lighthouse and Mary's reef it is protected from all winds except due S.W., which, however, causes *no swell*, the reef *beating down the roughest sea*. The only swell in the harbour is from S.E., but is never sufficient to be cause of danger to the smallest craft. A lighter laden with deals has been known to ride out the severest gale in perfect safety.

Shepody is the only low water harbour and place of refuge above St. John. The anchorage is excellent. There is but little run of tide or drift ice in the harbour; the strength of tide and run of ice being outside Grindstone Island into and out of the Petitcodiac and Memramcook rivers. All persons acquainted with the navigation of the Bay are of opinion that the erection of the wharves and piers necessary for the business of the Albert Railway will render Shepody Harbour perfectly safe and free from ice at all seasons. Vessels lie safely at the wharves at Mary's Point, and depart thence during all months of the year.

The facilities which Shepody Harbour presents as an *ocean outlet* of the railway system of the *Dominion of Canada*, and as an *entrepôt* for the business of the vast interior; for manufacturing (being in the immediate vicinity of *large coal-fields*), for *shipbuilding*, for *shipping*; for building breakwaters, piers, wharves, &c., cannot be surpassed, if equalled, at any other port in the Bay of Fundy. The supply of wood and stone on the spot and in the vicinity is practically unlimited.

Statement of CAPTAIN ROBERT RUSSELL.

I am a native of Shepody, County of Albert, and now in my sixtieth year. I have followed the sea since I was twelve years of age. I commanded a vessel

for twenty years in the coasting trade in the Bay of Fundy, and have for many years been a pilot in the head-waters of the Bay. I am thoroughly well acquainted with the harbour at Mary's Point, and consider it the best and safest in the Bay. I have frequented it at all times and seasons, and never lost a rope yarn. It is the only low water harbour and place of refuge above St. John, and it possesses all the advantages and requisites for a large trade and shipping.

August 28th, 1867.

ROBERT RUSSELL.

CAPTAIN GEO. WOOD of *Shepody*.

I have been for twenty-five years engaged in the coasting trade in the Bay of Fundy, and am well acquainted with the harbour called Five Fathom Hole at the mouth of Shepody river.

This is a safe and commodious harbour formed by Mary's Point and Grindstone Island. I have been for sixteen years a Master Mariner, and during that period, and at all seasons of the year, I have frequented this harbour, and know the soundings as laid down in the Admiralty chart to be correct. There are five fathoms at dead low water, immediately off the end of the reef running out from Mary's Point, at the very lowest tides; and the anchorage is perfectly safe from all winds. Treating the reef as a foundation, a breakwater or pier could easily be constructed at which vessels of large tonnage could load and discharge at low water.

The anchorage ground in deep water is of ample extent for a large fleet of vessels, and I can speak with confidence of its great safety. I lay there with my vessel called the "Amherst" during the gale of the 2nd August instant, which was the most severe within my recollection. I was bound to St. John, but being overtaken by the gale I ran in there for shelter. The wind was from the most exposed quarter, but I took no injury; and other vessels heavily laden rode out the gale in perfect safety.

I consider this harbour the best in the Bay of Fundy, and most convenient for the purposes of extensive trade.

August 26th, 1867.

GEO. WOOD.

CAPTAIN WM. WOOD.

I have been for eighteen years engaged in the coasting trade in the Bay of Fundy, and am well acquainted with Five Fathoms Harbour (Shepody). I confirm the foregoing statement in all particulars. I have laid there during a storm with upwards of twenty vessels, none of which took any injury.

WILLIAM WOOD.

Statement of CAPT. P. A. SCOTT, of Her Majesty's Navy.

I fully agree with Captains Russell and Wood in their statements as to the capabilities of Five Fathoms Harbour, at the mouth of Shepody River. My knowledge of the anchorage is derived from *the actual survey* of it, and from having used it for years, while prosecuting the Hydrographic Survey of that part of the coast. It is, in fact, the only safe anchorage in that part of the Bay of Fundy available *at low water*; and is much frequented in bad weather.

P. A. SCOTT.

Extract from Report of CHARLES ROBB, C.E.

After describing the Cannel and Cannelite Mines of Albert County, he says of

THE ALBERT RAILWAY AND SHEPODY HARBOUR.

The value of these various properties will be very materially enhanced by the construction of the ALBERT COUNTY RAILWAY, designed to run from a point on the European and North American Railway to the best and most convenient harbour on the Bay of Fundy in Albert County, such harbour being undoubtedly that formed by Mary's Point and Grindstone Island (SHEPODY) at the mouth of the Petitcodiac and Shepody rivers.

This Railway will intersect the rich mineral districts some of the features and resources of which I have endeavoured to describe; and, besides opening up a rich agricultural district, will connect by short branches with the Albert Mines, Hillsborough Plaister works, &c. It will prove a most valuable adjunct to the European and North American, and especially to the Intercolonial Railway, which will be tapped at its northern terminus by the Albert Railway, the whole length of which to Shepody Harbour will be about 30 or 35 miles.

The Harbour of Mary's Point (Shepody) will afford a safe anchorage for a large fleet of vessels with at least twenty-five feet of water at the lowest tides, and is said to be open at all seasons; while the adjacent shore is highly favourable for the establishment and growth of a large town or city.

The advantages of such a harbour, in immediate connection with the Intercolonial Railway can scarcely be overestimated, affording as it does the most direct point of shipment for the rich products of the western and central parts of the Dominion of Canada, and for the extensive lumbering districts of New Brunswick. At the same time the peculiar mineral and other resources of the district, for which an extensive demand will probably spring up in the western cities, must contribute largely to the return freights.

The construction of the Bay Verte Canal, between the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy, is only a question of time, and when effected will add immensely to the importance of the proposed new harbour and railway as the nearest available point of shipment from the Intercolonial Railway and New Brunswick to Europe.

The Albert Railway, for about two thirds of the distance, will pass through a country peculiarly favourable for the construction of such a work. The remaining third—being the central division—although it must traverse an elevated and undulating region, presents no unusual engineering difficulties. The steepest grade will not exceed seventy feet to a mile. It is confidently anticipated that the Government subsidy of \$10,000 (ten thousand dollars) per mile will amply suffice to defray at least one half of the cost of construction and equipment of the whole line.

CHARLES ROBB,
Civil and Mining Engineer.

St. John, N. B.
24th September, 1867.